Global Politics and Civil Society
Globalization's effect on social movement mobilization can be seen as parallel to the transformation of contentious politics during the rise of national states (cf. Tilly 1984; Markoff 2003) . In a global institutional setting, movement efforts to shape the practices of a particular government require international legal or scientific expertise, understandings of the rivalries and practices of inter-state political bargaining, and/or capacities for mobilizing protests and otherwise bringing simultaneous pressure against multiple national governments. 1 Activists thus need organizations that can facilitate cross-cultural communication and manage diversity in order to articulate and advance a shared agenda.
2 It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that social movement organizations devoted especially to transnational level organizing and political action play key roles in global level contentious politics.
Data from the Yearbook of International Associations show that the numbers of active transnationally-organized citizens' groups (INGOs) 3 grew from less than 1,000 in the 1950s to nearly 20,000 in 1999 (Union of International Associations 2004) . Within this population of transnational voluntary associations, we find a subset of groups that are explicitly founded to promote some social or political change. Because such groups are more likely to be involved in processes surrounding social change, we focus our analysis on this smaller set of INGOs, which we call transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) . 5 The population of TSMOs has also expanded at a tremendous rate over recent decades from fewer than 100 organizations in the 1950s to more than 1,000 today. At the same time, we see some expansion in the global reach of these organizations as more groups are based in the global South 5 and as the sector expands to include other groups in society. However, a closer look reveals that participation in both INGOs and TSMOs varies dramatically across countries, and this is particularly true of countries outside the traditional core of the global economy. Data from the 2000 edition of the Yearbook indicate that core countries of the world system remain the most integrated, while later-industrializing regions are far less active in the international non-governmental and transnational social movement sectors. With regard to the broader population of INGOs, citizens in countries of the global North participate in an average of 2,600 organizations compared to an average of 613 for citizens in the global South. Moreover, there is far less variation in INGO participation across core countries than there is in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries. 6 While the difference between core and non-core countries for TSMO participation is not as dramatic, citizens in core countries participate on average in nearly three times as many TSMOs as citizens in noncore countries. The average core country has members in 408 TSMOs, while the average outside the core is just 138 organizations.
Citizens of France are most active in these groups, with 553 TSMOs and 3,551 INGOs reporting members in that country. At the other end of the scale of INGO participation are Afghanistan, North Korea and Oman, with an average of just 159 INGOs reporting members in those countries. Turkmenistan has the lowest involvement in TSMOs, with 15 organizations listing its citizens among their members. Of the 25 countries with the most active participation in INGOs and TSMOs, 19 are among the traditional core states. Also included here are Brazil, India, Argentina, Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.
Western Europeans are active in more than 80 percent of all TSMOs, and citizens of the United States and Canada participate in nearly 70 percent of all TSMOs. On the other hand, much of the developing world is less integrated into the transnational social movement sector, even if their participation has grown during the 1980s and 90s. People from Africa and Asia are active in only about 60 percent of all groups, the former Soviet region is active in about half of all TSMOs, while Middle Eastern countries participate in about 40 percent of TSMOs. This paper seeks to identify the factors that help explain these differing rates of transnational participation.
Factors Driving Participation in TSMOs
Building transnational alliances is not an easy process. Even where transnational social movement actors consciously work to incorporate more diverse peoples and issues, actually doing so can require exceptional costs and risks, and localized organizing is clearly cheaper and easier in many ways (Liebowitz 2000; Tarrow 2001a; 2001b; Smith 2000) . But the observed growth in transnational association suggests that various forces are working to both reduce the costs and risks of transnational organizing and to increase demand for it. We would thus expect that distribution of participation in global civil society is not random, but rather it is shaped by these social, political and economic factors that affect the costs and benefits of transnational association. Both state-and global-level factors shape the character and scope of transnational alliances. Global political and economic dynamics lead some regions and nations to be more or less oriented towards a global polity, and state level political processes allow variable levels of political participation by citizens (e.g., Kitchelt 1986; Koopmans 1999; Jenkins and Schock 1992; Joppke 1992; della Porta and Kriesi 1999) . Below we outline the major theoretical orientations that guide our attempt to explain participation in global civil society.
National Opportunities and Resources
A major theme in theories of globalization is that the rise of supranational institutions and transnational problems is reducing the power and autonomy of the state. Nevertheless, it is clear that the state remains crucial to both defining major political opportunities for challengers and shaping the forms and character of political association: (Tarrow 2001a: 2-3) However, it is also important to remember that states vary tremendously in the extent to which they are able to affect conditions within or outside their borders. The governments of the United States and France might be considered fairly autonomous and consequential domestic and international actors, while Bolivia and Somalia are much more limited in their abilities to affect global policy decisions or even to determine their own domestic policies. Similarly, citizens in global North countries tend to enjoy greater access to the resources and skills needed for global activism than do their Southern counterparts, and more importantly they also have greater political access to states with the largest influence over global policies (Bob 2001; Forthcoming) . Despite such differences, many analyses of political mobilization tend to treat the state as a comparable unit of analysis. 7 We will explore this assumption further in our analysis, which asks whether or not the factors shaping participation in TSMOs vary among different countries. Below we discuss how national contexts shape the possibilities for political participation and alter the costs and benefits of such participation.
Political Openness & Repression
Studies of national political opportunity emphasize the role of the national state in determining opportunities for citizens to engage in political discourse and action. Because participation in transnational social movements is one measure of an available infrastructure for coordinated protest activity, factors associated with the emergence of domestic protest are useful for our analysis. Among the domestic factors at work are the availability of resources for association, legislative and judicial systems that protect individual rights to free association and public speech, electoral rules that govern possibilities for political competition, alliances and conflicts among elites, and capacities for state action, including repression (e.g., Tarrow 1988) .
In her analysis of transnational conservation mobilization, Lewis (2002) found that the states that were most likely to be selected for transnational conservation projects were those that were both politically open and that had strong NGO sectors. She suggests that this pattern might be different from that found in the human rights issue-area, where there is evidence that the least open and most repressive societies would attract more transnational human rights activism, for example, those trying to engage what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call the "boomerang effect." Political regimes that discourage popular engagement in politics are not likely to be associated with high levels of civic engagement. On the other hand, we would expect that politically open states with vigorous and active civil societies would be the most involved in transnational SMOs. 8 Patricia Chilton tested this assumption that strong national civil societies would be required for effective transnational cooperation. She found, however, that while this was true for some cases, in East Germany and Czechoslovakia where national civil societies were comparatively weak, there were strong connections to transnational coalitions (Chilton 1995:206) . A capacity to form transnational coalitions in these cases was not dependent upon previous levels of (national) civil society development, and it was the ability to engage in transnational coalitions that contributed to the transformations of these societies (Chilton 1995) . Commonalities of language, symbolic references and the larger political context that affected all countries of eastern Europe served to condition the possibility of transnational coalition building despite the absence of liberal societal institutions in some of the countries. This finding leads to the question we investigate later of how supranational conditions might facilitate transnationalism between less geographically and/or culturally proximate peoples in cases where there are few domestic opportunities for organizing political challenges.
State repression also affects participation in transnational associations, but in some cases it can serve to counter the intentions of repressive states. High levels of repression may either stifle citizen participation in associations, or it might encourage the formation of ties to transnational associations that can serve as a source of protection against government repression (e.g., Sikkink 1993; Coy 1997) . Also, countries with longer histories of democratic governance should have more of the human capital necessary for active civil societies both nationally and transnationally. For example, in his study of the formation of human rights associations, Patrick Ball found that countries with longer democratic traditions were more fruitful sites for organizing (Ball 2000) . In short, state policies that affect the costs of participation in politics and public associations should have strong influences on the levels of participation in transnational SMOs.
Resources
Economic and social resources are also crucial to the emergence and strength of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McCarthy 1996; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996) . We would expect, therefore, that participation in transnational SMOs will vary with the availability of resources for mobilization across countries. Thus, we expect that countries with a relatively large and educated middle class would have greater participation rates in transnational social movement organizations than poorer countries. Levels of economic development will also have a strong influence on citizens' access to important communications infrastructures that assist participation in global civil society groups.
Participation in transnational associations is also likely to be determined by the character of the national voluntary sector (e.g., Schofer and Fourcade-Gournchas 2001; Curtis et al. 2001 ). Associational networks, or mobilizing structures, provide the foundation for movement organizing, cultivating spaces for information sharing, building solidarity and cultivating shared identities. Where there are opportunities for citizens to freely engage in a variety of voluntary associations, there is a greater propensity towards involvement in diverse social movement organizations (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Minkoff 1997 While it is important to distinguish national level factors from transnational ones, we emphasize that these ostensibly national conditions are often strongly influenced by global processes, particularly in the global South. World system and dependency theories postulate that internal grievances, as well as the availability of resources to address them, are affected by a country's location in the world system, among other factors. Thus, a country's position in the world economic hierarchy is likely to influence people's decisions about whether to participate in transnational collective action aimed at changing their conditions. It is to the system of international economic relations that we now turn our attention.
Structural Relationship to the World System
The relationship of a state to the capitalist world economy has been identified as an important causal factor in the emergence and spread of rebellion (Jenkins and Schock 1992) . It shapes both the opportunities for domestic challengers to organize and engage in collective action against the state, and it constrains the state's capacity to respond to popular challenges (Maney
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2002; Muñoz 2002) . Two key arguments have been forwarded to explain this relationship. First, the practices of expanding states and empires, such as the imposition of private property and coerced labor, have been linked to protest and rebellion of various kinds. Second, colonialism and dependency have contributed to conditions such as widening inequality, slowed economic growth and rapid urbanization. These factors increase the mobilization potential of lower classes while dividing elites, increasing dependency on foreign capital, and weakening the legitimacy of the state (Jenkins and Schock 1992; Walton and Seddon 1994) .
At the same time, the demand of the capitalist world economy for cheap labor from the global South contributes to the political exclusion and repression of lower and working classes in those states. Thus, for example, Mitchell and McCormick (1989) found that periphery countries with higher levels of trade with advanced capitalist countries were more likely to imprison and torture their citizens than were those with fewer economic ties. In a globalized economy, states outside the core (and increasingly within the core) compete for foreign investment by reducing protections for workers. The repressive and exclusive character of many global South states can be traced back to their colonial origins. As a consequence of their late integration into the system of national states, the manipulation of borders and inter-group tensions by colonial powers, and the Cold War politics of military aid, states in the global South tend to be highly repressive and to have much greater capacities for -mostly coercive -collective action than do other societal actors within their national borders (Tilly 1990: chapter 7) . In contrast, core state governments have more resources with which to respond to the demands of citizens, and they tend to be more democratic than non-core states. This analysis suggests that, rather than serving as tools for economic development, key mechanisms of global economic integration -foreign investment, trade and loans -will lead to the continued exploitation of many states and their weakest members (Timberlake and Williams 1984; Hippler 1995) .
Further limiting opportunities for political mobilization in the global South is the fact that core states intervene directly in the domestic political processes of Southern states in order to support regimes that are favorable to their economic interests. Ironically, such activity is often legitimated by a claim that it is helping to support democratic development in a subject country. William Robinson (1996) refers to this intervention as the promotion of "low intensity democracy" or "polyarchy," where electoral competition and governance is restricted, through a variety of interventions, to those alternatives that do not threaten the economic interests of the core. This generally means that politicians must agree to open their nation's markets to foreign goods and investments, privatize state industries and to continue making payments on international debts.
Not only do global South countries tend to have fewer domestic political opportunities for social movements, but their domestic contexts are more strongly determined by global-level processes than are those of core countries. 10 In other words, it is much harder for activists in the global South to ignore global processes and institutions than it might be for activists in the core. At the same time, the world system hierarchy makes both elite and social movement actors in the global South far less able to affect both the domestic as well as the foreign decisions that shape their environments than do their counterparts in the core (or the "global North").
11 This may be expected to increase the demand for transnational ties in the global South. And although weak and threatened states may repress political organizations that target domestic actors, they may be more tolerant of groups that are critical of the global financial institutions and foreign capital. Neoliberal-oriented policy makers and popular discourse (in the global North, at least) either explicitly or implicitly claim that a country's integration into the global economy will produce economic growth that, in turn, will generate other social benefits such as improved quality of life, environmental preservation and political openness. We refer to this as the "trickle down" theory of globalization. If this theory is accurate, we would expect that higher levels of trade and foreign investment in a country would be associated with more dense transnational associational ties. Thus, we would expect to find a positive relationship between global economic integration and other forms of global interactions, including participation in civil society associations. Sassen's work (1998) provides a more elaborate understanding of how global economic ties might affect transnational mobilization, and her work leads us to expect that flows of trade and direct foreign investment will positively affect levels of participation in TSMOs, but not as a result of the trickle down of supposed benefits of economic growth. Instead, these economic relations serve as mechanisms that foster transnational social ties, flows of technology and communications infrastructures. The following hypotheses emerge from the preceding discussion of the world economic system: H H3 3: : Participation in TSMOs will be highest in the richer, core countries of the world economy.
H H4 4: : Participation in TSMOs will be highest in countries that are most integrated into the global economy, i.e., those with comparatively higher levels of global trade and investment.

H H5 5: : Countries that are integrated into the global economy in a highly dependent manner (i.e., the poorest countries) will have higher rates of participation in TSMOs.
We drew from neoliberal and institutional arguments to articulate these hypotheses, but we note that world systems theorists would argue that the global economy affects countries differently, depending upon their position in the world-system hierarchy. So while economic integration may benefit core countries and their citizens, it has detrimental effects on the countries and people outside the core. Thus, our analysis will investigate how world-system position interacts with measures of economic integration to affect TSMO participation.
Levels of Integration into the Global Political System
Despite the emphases in popular discourse on economic forms of globalization, integration of states into a global society also takes on political and social forms. Although the international political arena has not replaced the nation-state as a mobilizing context for social movements, it has become increasingly important by expanding the available political space for building alliances and providing a common focal point for contention. Transnational social movements play an important role not only in the continuing construction of the international political arena but also in the enforcement of internationally-generated policies and treaties adopted by states (Smith 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998) . But the extent to which political actors will choose to bring a particular grievance to transnational political arenas is also shaped by that country's involvement in the global political order. As Risse-Kappen argues:
The (1995: 6-7) While national structures continue to present certain obstacles for mobilization, the existence of international norms and the growing authority of supranational structures increase nongovernmental actors' potential for influencing national policy (Risse-Kappen 1995) . In the absence of resources and formal mechanisms for enforcing most international treaties, social movement organizations have played an important role in monitoring international agreements. Thus, participation in the transnational social movement sector is more likely in states that have ratified international treaties. Other factors also affect a state's incorporation into a global political order. For example, Reimann (2002) shows that when a country hosts or otherwise participates in international conferences, their national elites become socialized in international norms that accept non-governmental organizations as legitimate participants in global conferences, and they begin to at least pay lip service to the idea that civil society deserves a voice in national and international policy debates. 13 This creates opportunities for that country's social movement sector to expand its domestic mobilization as well as its access to national and international political processes.
Participation in international treaties also signals a state's incorporation into what Boli and his colleagues call the "world polity." Thomas 1997, 1999; Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999; Meyer et al. 1997a Meyer et al. , 1997b . A state's participation in international organizations serves as evidence of its adoption of a wider system of values, beliefs and organizing principles (e.g., Frank et al. 2000; Frank 1999) . These "world cultural values" are strongly influenced by Western ideologies and include individualism, legal-scientific rationalism, economic liberalism and civic voluntarism. According to the world cultural perspective, as states become increasingly enmeshed in the world polity (e.g., through participation in international organizations and agreements of all kinds), they begin to internalize world cultural values and to mimic the organizational routines of other actors in their environments. This facilitates transnational association among people from different nations who, as a result of their countries' involvement in the world polity, face very similar structures of opportunity and grievance and find common cultural tools for interpreting and responding to problems (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Giugni 2002) .
Another institutional dynamic that scholars of global institutions have identified is what we might call the "hypocrisy paradox." This refers to the institutional dynamics that encourage weak states to join international treaties in order to enhance their international legitimacy, even though they have no intention of following such agreements. Notions of what an effective state is come from observations of what other states do, and participating in interstate negotiations and signing treaties is an essential aspect of state action. Moreover, once accepted into the community of states, a country can sign treaties in order to influence the course of negotiations and to draw upon the symbolic and concrete resources of international institutions, which can enhance its capacity to perform the basic functions of a state. Countries might even compete with each other for favorable international standing and whatever material benefits may come from that (Boli 1999; Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005) . Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2003) tested this assumption, and they found a negative association between the ratification of international human rights treaties and actual human rights practices. They also found that, although in the short term human rights practices did not correspond to treaty requirements, over time human rights practices improved. They associate these improvements with the fact that treaty participation assisted the emergence of civil society groups that advanced human rights claims against the state through international human rights machinery.
14 This interpretation is supported by the work of Patrick 
Data and Methods
The dependent variable for this study is a count of the number of TSMOs that report having members in a given country. We identified the population of transnational social movement organizations from the 2000/2001 Yearbook of International Associations, the most comprehensive, annual census of international associations. The Yearbook is edited by the Union of International Associations (UIA), which was formally charged by the United Nations with the task of assembling a regular database of all international and transnational organizations. Coders reviewed all entries in the Yearbook to identify those international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that were explicitly formed to promote some social or political change goal (broadly defined). 15 The majority of social movement organizations in our dataset were organized around the issues of human rights, women's rights, environmental protection, peace, economic justice or some combination of these issues. 16 For each organization, we collected this information: headquarters location, issue focus, founding year, structure, membership type, change strategies, ties with other organizations, and countries of membership. A matrix of all the organizations and countries was created in STATA. Values of 1 and 0 were used to indicate whether or not an organization had members in a given country. Next, the data were aggregated to obtain the total number of organizations active in each of the countries. This aggregate number of organizations per country is our measure of the extent to which a given country's citizens participate in TSMOs.
Our control variables measure the influence of domestic factors on levels of participation in transnational associations. Total population, domestic resources and level of democracy are included in the analysis. Data for population were collected from the World Bank and included all residents of a country regardless of legal status or citizenship. Countries with less than one million people are excluded from analysis because for more than 30 percent of the countries in this group, data were missing on other important variables. To measure the levels of domestic resources available within a society, we divided the countries into three economic
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17 Importantly, the income measure indicates the relevance of world-system position for transnational participation, with the low-income classification corresponding most closely with the group of countries that would be considered peripheral with regard to access and influence within the world economic system. Finally, we incorporate a measure of the extent to which a country's political system creates opportunities for public associations and political participation of any kind, expecting that more democratic societies would provide greater opportunities for mobilization. We use data from the Jaggers and Gurr Polity III data set to measure the extent of regime openness.
The extent to which a country's level and type of integration into the global economy influences citizen participation in TSMOs is measured by a selection of variables including trade, foreign direct investment, official development assistance flows and external debt. Data for trade and FDI were collected from the World Bank. The CIA's World Fact Book was our source for data on amount of external debt. Finally, ODA flows are measured with data from both the World Bank and the OECD. Because this variable aims to capture the economic ties among both donor and recipient countries, and because we include other measures to indicate differences between rich and poor countries, we use absolute values of both incoming and outgoing flows of ODA as a percentage of GNP. Detailed descriptions of each of our economic measures appear in Appendix 1.
To measure the breadth of a country's integration into global political institutions, we recorded participation in all intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), years of membership in the United Nations, and the number of major human rights treaties to which the country is a party. Data for IGO participation were collected from the Yearbook of International Associations as counts of the numbers of intergovernmental organizations in which a country participates. The number of years each country has been a member of the U.N. is calculated as of 1995.
18
Data for the number of major human rights treaties ratified were collected from Multilateral Treaties on Deposit with the UN Secretary General.
19 Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the key measures used in this study.
20
All of our global economic measures, along with population and IGO memberships, were logged in order to reduce the effects of extreme observations. We chose to tighten the distributions rather than drop outliers because these represent real data points. Because population, trade and debt have extreme ranges and are skewed to the right, we chose a base 10 transformation. (See Cleveland 1984.) Although FDI and ODA have less extreme distributions, they are positively skewed, so we used the log 10 transformation on these variables as well. 21 Moreover, debt and ODA have raw values that are less than 1. Because the logarithm for such values is undefined, we increased the minimum value of the two distributions by adding 1 to all values before transforming them.
We expect our economic and political measures to have a delayed effect on participation in transnational civil society. However, we expect the effects of political factors on participation in transnational civil society to be more temporally proximate than the effects of the economic factors. This is the case because the causal relationship between domestic or global political factors and participation in transnational civil society is often bi-directional. That is, a government's participation in international forums is often a response to either direct or indirect pressure from civil society groups, and once a government signs a treaty, it must provide regular reports on its progress, thereby encouraging attention from civil society advocates.
22 Therefore, we allow less lag time between political integration and TSMO participation than we do between global economic integration and TSMO participation. We use 1990 as the baseline year for our economic measures. For countries of the former Soviet Union, 1990 data were not generally available; In those cases, we used the closest available year to 1990. Also, ODA was collected for 1991 because 1990 data were unavailable for more than 30 percent of the countries for which we had TSMO data. To test whether one or two years' difference affected model outcomes, ODA data for 1992 and remaining economic measures for 1994 were substituted in the models. The substituted values did not yield statistically different results from those in our reported models. Political measures were collected for 1995, except for our measure of democracy, which was collected for the final year that Jaggers and Gurr compiled world democracy measures -1994.
Interaction terms were created using the mean-centered, main effect variables. Meancentering corrects for multicollinearity and is a widely accepted technique (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) . We assessed eigen values and the means of variance inflation factors (Neter et al. 1996) and determined that our models were not weakened by multicollinearity.
Analysis of Count Data
Our dependent variable is a discrete count of organizational memberships. Because count data do not follow a normal distribution, we tested our proposed models to determine if they violated any of the assumptions of OLS regression. We first fit a model containing all of our predictor variables. We then executed a Cook-Weisberg test (Goldstein 1992a) for heteroskedasticty using the fitted values for the logged count of TSMO memberships. We tested the null hypothesis that our model exhibits constant variance against the alternative that and conclude that our model violates the assumption of homoskedasticity. We then performed a Ramsey test (Goldstein 1992b ) using powers of the fitted values of the logged dependent variable to test whether unmeasured variance was evident. We tested the null hypothesis that our model has no omitted variance against the alternative that it does. The test led us to reject the null hypothesis (chi 2 = 2.86; p <= .05) and conclude that our model contains unmeasured variance. In sum, even when our dependent variable is log-transformed, our models violate the assumptions of OLS regression. Therefore, a model that relaxes these assumptions and includes a parameter that accounts for the unmeasured variance is required.
In the following analyses, we use a generalized version of the Poisson model -negative binomial regression estimated by maximum likelihood (Hammond and Holly1998; Agresti 1996) . By relaxing the assumptions that underlie the Poisson model, negative binomial regression allows for excess variability (overdispersion) among event counts (King 1989). Our models take on the following negative binomial form:
, is included in our models. The value of the parameter represents the factor by which the variance of i exceeds its expectation. When 2 approaches 1, the negative binomial model is the same as Poisson. A significant overdispersion parameter translates into a rejection of the null hypothesis that i =1. Table 2 reports estimates of the effects of our control variables and measures of global economic and political integration on rates of TSMO participation. Control variables are significant across models. Population and democracy are positively and significantly associated with TSMO participation, while middle-and low-income countries have significantly lower rates of participation in transnational organizations than do high income countries. These findings support Tarrow's (2001) argument that factors internal to states condition participation in transnational society and, (not surprisingly) they point to the importance of economic and human resources for movement mobilization. Model 2 includes estimates for our measures of global economic integration. Contrary to the assumptions of the "trickle down" model of globalization, neither of the positive economic integration measures of trade and foreign investment has a significant effect on TSMO participation. 23 These findings suggest that flows of trade and direct foreign investment do not serve directly as catalysts for other types of transnational interactions. A second measure of the extensiveness of ties to the global economy -official aid flows -bears a positive, significant relationship with transnational association counts. 24 We note that the bivariate negative relationship between ODA and TSMO participation (r = -.372) is reversed in the regression context. Because the bivariate relationship between income level and both ODA and TSMO participation is negative, we interpret the sign reversal in the model as evidence of a suppressor effect. That is, the relationship between ODA and TSMO participation is suppressed by the relationship between income level and TSMO participation. The coefficient indicating the strength and direction of the bivariate relationship between ODA and TSMO participation is overly influenced by the very high TSMO participation in high-income countries. GNP per capita is positively associated with participation (.68) but is negatively
Results
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The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society • 633 associated with ODA flows (-.52). When we control for income, the sign reverses: as ODA flows increase so too does TSMO participation. We explain the positive effect of aid as growing from the tendency of transnational aid flows to generate multiple forms of transnational interaction -including ties among non-governmental organizations 25 -that encourage a proliferation of transnational ties (cf. Sassen 1998) .
The coefficients of Model 2 suggest that TSMO participation increases by almost 14 percent for every 25 percent increase in ODA. 26 The net improvement of model fit for the model containing economic measures over the model with control variables only is small but significant (G 2 = 15.22 for the difference between -799.25 and -791.64, p <= .01).
Before we assess the relationship between political integration measures and TSMO participation, we test the World System theorists' claim that global dynamics will affect highly dependent states differently. As we discussed above, low income countries with high levels of debt and aid are integrated into the global economy in ways that should differ from those without such dependence on international finance. Moreover, there is empirical evidence to suggest that higher levels of global trade are often not favorable to democratic practices, including transnational associational participation (e.g., Mitchell and McCormick 1989; Tilly 1995) . To test our hypothesis that countries integrated into the global economy in a highly dependent manner would have comparatively higher rates of participation than others, we created an interaction term that compares participation among low-income countries with varying levels of external debt and trade. Model 3 contains the results of this analysis. The coefficient for the interaction between low income and trade is both positive and significant, while the coefficient for the constituent effect of trade is negative (although not statistically significant). This suggests that the trade effect is significantly larger for low income countries than for other countries. In other words, for the poorest countries, ties to global trade networks improve their chances of participation in TSMOs, while the same does not hold for other countries. The coefficient implies that participation in TSMOs among low income countries increase by 21 percent for every 25 percent increase in trade. 27 The interaction term for debt and low income countries is not significant, suggesting that the effect of debt on TSMO participation is not significantly different for low income countries than for other countries.
It is also interesting to note that although neither of the coefficients is significant, the constituent effect of debt is negative while the interaction between low income and debt is positive, a pattern also revealed in other models we tested. This pattern might be explained by the fact that the World Bank and IMF connect the interests of northern taxpayers with southern interests. Moreover, these institutions have expanded their connections with civil society groups in borrowing countries in response to its critics (Nelson 1996; Fox and Brown 1998; O'Brien et al. 2000; Khagram 2002) , thus serving as a potential broker among civil society actors both within and outside the country. So while highly dependent countries are likely to be poorer, they may have more opportunities for cultivating transnational alliances than do those without extensive international financial assistance. The international campaign to abolish third world debt, spearheaded by a TSMO called Jubilee 2000, reflects this kind of alliance. We stress that the relationship is not significant, but that it does warrant further investigation.
Model 4 introduces our measures of global political integration along with our control variables. IGO participation and the number of human rights treaties ratified are significant and are positively associated with TSMO participation, irrespective of levels of domestic resources and internal political opportunities. Increasing IGO participation by 25 percent amounts to a 53 percent increase in TSMO participation. When the number of human rights treaties ratified increases from 0 to 5 (the average), TSMO participation goes up by 47 percent. This offers strong support for the world culture argument that a country's integration into a global polity influences domestic norms and institutions in ways that should expand
The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society • 635
individuals' participation in civic life. 28 Our method provides support for a causal argument that more extensive involvement in global institutions produces higher levels of TSMO participation. Moreover, the results of our regression of TSMO participation on the lagged global political integration measures suggest that governmental involvement in the world polity provides a realm of opportunity above and beyond state-bounded opportunities for participation in TSMOs. Our theory leads us to expect that civil society pressures can and do influence government decisions to join international treaties and organizations, but once they join, institutional pressures will reproduce norms and practices that encourage further popular mobilization (Frank 1999; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2003) . The fit of our model to the data is much improved by including measures of global political integration (G 2 = 95.42 for the difference between -799.25 and -751.54, p <= .001).
In model 5, we test for differences in the effects of global political factors between lowincome and other countries. The negative (though non-significant) coefficient for the effects of the ratification of human rights treaties among low-income countries is consistent with the expectations of the "hypocrisy" thesis. Countries often ratify treaties with few intentions of enforcing them, and low-income countries may be particularly likely to do so, given that this is a relatively low-cost way of attaining status and legitimacy in the inter-state system and that poor countries are more vulnerable to international pressures. But Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui's research (2003) suggests that this negative relationship between treaty participation and human rights practice is temporary. Over time, they argue, the practices of states will gradually conform to the norms of world culture (Clark 2003) . Our finding that TSMO participation among the more politically vulnerable low-income countries also increases when those governments are involved in a greater number of IGOs supports their notion of a hypocrisy paradox (Ball 2000) . The significance of the interaction term for low-income countries and IGO participation reveals that the effect of IGO participation is significantly greater for low-income countries than for other countries when we control for domestic factors and other measures of integration in a global polity.
In model 6 we combine all measures of global economic and political integration. When we control for levels of global political integration, the main effect of trade bears a positive and marginally significant relationship with TSMO participation. Two of our measures of global political integration sustain positive and significant relationships with TSMO participation, irrespective of levels of global economic integration and domestic factors. ODA is not significant in this model. The likelihood ratio test statistic reveals that inclusion of global economic measures in the model with global political integration measures and control variables provides no significant improvement of fit over the model with global political integration and domestic measures only (G 2 = 4.04 for the difference between -751.54 and -749.52, p > .05). Model 7 incorporates all of our measures along with our interactions between low income and measure of global economic and political integration. The earlier pattern regarding the positive, significant difference in TSMO participation among low-income countries with higher rates of trade compared to other countries is not apparent when rates of participation in global political institutions are taken into consideration. This finding further bolsters our argument that global political institutions matter more for fostering participation in transnational society than do global economic ties, and this is particularly true for low-income countries.
Regarding the positive and significant associations between global political integration and TSMO participation, a 25 percent increase in participation in IGOs yields a 25 percent surge in participation in transnational TSMOs for high-and middle-income countries. This improvement in participation grows by 29 percent for low-income countries for the same percentage increase in IGO involvement. Interestingly, the interaction term used to test the hypocrisy thesis approaches significance in this model. For low-income countries, the effect of treaty ratification is lower than that for middle-and high-income countries. A one unit increase in the number of treaties ratified in high-and middle-income countries results in an 11 percent rise in TSMO participation, net all other factors. Among low-income countries, participation improves by roughly 4 percent with every one-unit increase in treaty ratification. This finding supports the contention that international institutions matter and that their impact is mediated by a country's position in the global economic hierarchy. Low-income countries may be more hypocritical in relation to international human rights treaties because they are more likely to sign treaties as a way of compensating for their relative weakness in the interstate system. They also may tend to have less intention of following treaty commitments than their richer counterparts (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2003) . While participation in treaties does increase the chances that individuals and organizations in low-income countries will be represented in TSMOs, the relatively lower engagement of civil society in those countries dampens this effect relative to its impact on countries with higher income levels.
Appendix 2 contains the observed and predicted values for TSMO participation for every country in our analysis grouped by World Bank income classification. An index of dissimilarity is calculated to compare the expected distributions with the observed distributions. A score for each group appears at the bottom of the tables. The scores show that our models predict rates of TSMO participation better for high income countries than for others. Since there is far less variation in the essential predictors of participation, namely levels of democracy, IGO memberships and human rights treaty ratification, this is not a surprising result. Moreover, there is less variation across high income countries in TSMO participation. For the wealthier group of countries, around 6 percent of cases would have to be redistributed to match the observed distributions. The comparable figures for middle and low income countries are 11 percent and 13 percent respectively.
Conclusion
Some scholars of globalization argue that the rise of supranational institutions and an increasingly integrated global economy signals the decline of the national state, but our study suggests that such a conclusion is premature at best. The state still matters tremendously in conditioning the possibilities for individuals to engage in political associations that cross national boundaries. Regardless of the availability of material resources for political mobilization, countries with stronger democratic traditions were better represented in transnational social movement organizations.
Most notably, our findings challenge predominant assumptions that it is the economic forms of global integration that matter the most. Controlling for other factors, we found no significant effects of important measures of economic integration -amount of foreign direct investment, aid flows and trade -on participation in TSMOs. Moreover, the models including only economic integration measures were the weakest among those we tested.
Our results provide strong support for our contention that international institutions matter, at least for explaining how people engage in transnational political action. Countries with structured, routine participation in the global polity -measured in terms of memberships in international organizations and treaties -are more likely to become "socialized" into the norms of international society (Finnemore 1996; Riemann 2002) . These are the same countries that are likely to have comparatively higher levels of citizen participation in TSMOs. Evidence from other studies suggests that transnational or world cultural processes are becoming more influential over time. Longitudinal studies by Ramirez and his colleagues and by Tsutsui and Wotipka found stronger world cultural effects on the adoption of women's The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society • 637 suffrage and on participation in international human rights NGOs, respectively, in more recent years than they found in earlier years (Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan 1997; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2003) . Thus, if we test our models with data from earlier time periods, we would expect to find much weaker connections between a state's integration into the global polity and its levels of transnational participation.
Global political institutions matter, but we also found that their impact varies according to a country's position in the world-system hierarchy. We found that low-income countries with higher numbers of ties to intergovernmental organizations tended to participate more in transnational associations than those with fewer ties. This finding corresponds best with an institutional or world polity explanation rather than with the notion that economic globalization drives other forms of transnational interaction. Countries that are more vulnerable to pressures from richer states may find opportunities for enhancing their influence in global affairs through global institutions. Global institutions extend legitimacy to a state, thereby providing incentives for governments to join them. Paradoxically, by using international institutions to bolster their position in the inter-state system, low-income countries create internal conditions that encourage civil society mobilization within their borders, and although they may join treaties with few intentions of following them, they may soon face rising internal pressures to conform to international standards.
Our study leads us to some suggestions for future research. First, while our findings related to economic integration measures were robust across a variety of tests, disaggregated measures of trade may shed more light on the relationship between economic integration and other forms of global engagement. The robust standard error for our trade variable tended to be high compared to that for other variables, suggesting a disconnect between our conceptualization of trade and its measurement. And conceptually, we know that a society with high import trade may differ in important ways from a society with high export trade with regard to opportunities for transnational association, as will countries whose primary exports are in extractive industries rather than manufacturing. For our purposes, however, it was worthwhile to maintain the degrees of freedom, given the size of our population, and we note that our analysis yielded robust results. Additionally, as noted in the text, the pattern of the relationship between TSMO participation and debt warrants further investigation. Citizens of low-income countries having relatively high amounts of external debt may tend to have more involvement in transnational economic rights and justice movements than their counterparts in low-income countries with relatively low amounts of external debt. Scholars have uncovered evidence of a burgeoning in cross-border alliance formation around structural adjustment policies and the increasing debt burden of poor countries (e.g., Desmarais 2002) . Hence, the relationship between debt and TSMO participation might be brought into greater relief if the dependent variable was disaggregated by issue area.
In sum, we find that the size and comprehensiveness of global civil society is strongly related to increased global political integration, not economic integration. The "trickle-down" theory of global integration -i.e., that economic integration will produce economic growth that, in turn, supports and encourages other forms of transnational cooperation -is not supported with the evidence we use here. Instead, it is a country's participation in intergovernmental organizations and in global treaty bodies that encourages its citizens to engage in other forms of transnational association, and this can overcome the disadvantages of a country's position in the world economy. More democratic countries are the most active participants in all forms of transnational association, but the results here show that the direction of influence may be two-way. Institutional norms and pressures can lead non-democratic states to join international treaties and organizations. Global political integration, in turn, encourages democratization within countries by legitimizing values of pluralism, equality and tolerance and by creating processes that can socialize states along these values (Boli and Thomas 1999; UNDP 2002) . In the aftermath of September 11 and the ongoing U.S.-led global war on terror, multilateral institutions may prove even more central to efforts of all countries to promote their own security interests (U.S. arguments to the contrary notwithstanding). And the new demands being made on the United Nations attest to this development. This should contribute to the strengthening and democratization 29 of multilateral political institutions and, as our study shows, to an increasingly integrated, more comprehensive, and vibrant global civil society.
Notes
1. For more on the political dynamics of social movements within nested national and interstate politics see Rothman and Oliver (2002) , Tarrow (2001a; , and Smith, Pagucco and Chatfield (1997) .
2. Many social scientists discuss the importance of networks in contemporary global settings. Certainly the proliferation of relatively low-cost communications and travelrelated technologies have enabled more informal and decentralized relations to span an ever-widening geographic scope. While we clearly see networks embedded within the organizations we study, we focus here on more formally structured relationships (i.e., organizations), because these are likely to be more durable and predictable than "networks," and they also allow for large scale and longitudinal comparisons that would be very difficult to do with networks. That said, it is clear that the organizations we analyze operate in ways that are similar to networks; they build on the technologies and opportunities that also facilitate networks, and in many ways they are becoming more decentralized and informal like networks.
3. INGOs is the common term used among practitioners and in much of the political science literature and within the United Nations System to refer to voluntary, nonprofit citizens associations. It includes groups as diverse as the International Olympic Committee, Amnesty International and the International Elvis Presley Fan Club.
4. While other non-governmental organizations are important in social movements, existing research suggests that it is those groups that are specifically focused on movement goals that play consistent roles in either mobilizing or introducing innovations into social movements. Thus, we focus on those groups that we expect to be most involved in social movement activity (Smith et al. 1997 ).
5. Following common practices among scholars and practitioners of global politics, we use the terms "global North" to refer to the Western, post-industrial states (members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD), and "global South" to refer to those post-colonial and later-industrializing states that generally comprise what world-systems scholars call the "periphery" and "semi-periphery."
6. The standard deviation for non-core countries is 74 percent of mean compared to 23 percent for core countries.
7. However, the work of Tilly (1990) , Walton and Seddon (1994) , and of World Systems theorists argues for a treatment of the state that accounts for its position in the global economic and political order.
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8. Our preliminary examination of this hypothesis suggests, however, that transnational human rights groups are not any more likely to be active in repressive contexts, at least not in the sense that they have participants from those regions among their members. In fact, environmental groups -perhaps because their grievances can in some instances be cast in more politically neutral terms -seem somewhat better able to cultivate transnational ties in more repressive settings.
9. We currently lack comparative data on the strength of national voluntary sectors, but existing measures of political openness and democratic practice indicate the extent to which citizens of a country enjoy the right to free association.
10. This is not meant to imply that the domestic politics of core states are not affected by global factors (e.g., Evangelista 1995; Knopf 1993) , but rather that periphery states are more vulnerable to external influences on a wider range of policy areas.
11. Several respondents to a survey Smith conducted of affiliates of a transnational organization, EarthAction, captured this sentiment as they described a sense of being doubly disenfranchised: they had little effective access to their domestic political leaders, and their governments had little impact on the United Nations, which they saw as being dominated by the United States (Smith 2002 14. A similar dynamic is outlined in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's (1999) "spiral model" for explaining changes in human rights practices and in Clark (2003) .
15. Coders worked as a team to identify cases for inclusion in the study. We excluded religious bodies or groups promoting some religious or spiritual order, foundations and research institutes from the database. Most groups could easily be classified as socialchange oriented or not. The cases that were not readily discerned were reviewed by two other research team members, including the principal investigator (Smith) . Groups that tended to cause difficulties were ones working for development, which often engage primarily in service as opposed to advocacy/ empowerment work. For details on case selection and coding, contact Jackie Smith.
16. The predominance of progressive organizations in our dataset is due, in part, to the systematic under-reporting of right-wing and extremist groups. The illicit nature of some of these groups' activities and the exclusionary nature of their organizing work make them less likely to respond to Yearbook requests for information or be tied to international networks that increase their profile among other international groups. Nevertheless, Yearbook editions include records of such groups, and the Internet allows them to identify more of them. Thus, these groups are included in the dataset, but their numbers are quite small.
17
. We also constructed a domestic resources scale, which included the sum of the deviation scores for GNP per capita, percentage of enrollment in tertiary education and percentage of urban population. We ran the models with this scale (omitting the dummy variables for GNP per capita) and achieved results similar to those reported below. We decided not to use one or both of the other variables included in the scale in our final models because of multicolinearity. GNP per capita is highly correlated with the other two variables, and we concluded that although there may be slight conceptual differences between the variables, they essentially measure the same phenomenon.
18. The dates of membership were recorded from the New York Times Almanac.
19. The treaties included in this count are considered the major instruments of human rights law. 21. We then used a natural log transformation and tested our models. We excluded extreme observations and found that unlike in our models containing the base 10-transformed variables, outliers influenced our results.
22. Indirect pressure is the result of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call a "boomerang effect," when groups within a repressive political context forge alliances with transnational actors that can bring pressure on that state through international institutions.
23. The original bivariate relationship between trade and TSMO participation is negative, though close to 0. In model 2, when we control for domestic factors, trade takes on a positive, but nonsignificant, relationship with TSMO participation. Because there is a strong, negative relationship between population and trade, as well as a strong, positive relationship between population and TSMO participation, we interpret the change in sign as the result of a suppressor effect. In this case, population suppresses the relationship between trade and TSMO participation, particularly for low-income countries, which tend to have lower participation in TSMOs as well as lower trade than other countries.
24. To determine if the smaller standard deviation scores for donor countries (i.e. countries at the lower end of our ODA flows scale) were biasing our results, we ran the models for recipient countries only and compared these to the models that include all countries. First, we note that the bivarate relationship between TSMO participation and ODA received is not as strong for recipient countries only as it is when all countries are included in the analysis (-.104 for recipient countries and -.372 for all countries). However, when ODA is included in regression models comparing rates of TSMO participation among recipient countries only, we find the same relationship between ODA flows and TSMO participation as we report in table 2, which includes both donors and recipients.
25. During the 1990s, increasing amounts of bilateral aid was channeled through nongovernmental organizations or NGOs.
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26. The coefficients were transformed into incident rate ratios or IRR ( i = exp(␣ + ␤ i i + … + ␤ k k ). For logged variables, the percent increase was derived by multiplying the IRR by log10([100+]/100), where is equal to the percent change in the predictor variable (25 in this case).
27. We note that the sign for the contingent effect of trade does change from positive to negative in regression model 3, where the economic interaction terms are included. Although we protected against multicollinearity by mean-centering the interaction term before entering it into the model, a small degree of multicollinearity is likely to be present. We tested the tolerance of the coefficients to investigate whether inclusion of the interaction terms yields unstable estimates. In the model without the interaction term for low income and trade, tolerance is .210 and the value inflation factor is 4.8 for low income, representing the lowest tolerance in the model and, therefore, the highest variance inflation. When the interaction terms for low-income/trade and low-income/debt are added (political integration variables are not included here), the tolerance for the lowincome coefficient does not change. In the full model, however, the tolerance decreases to .171 and the variance inflation factor reaches 5.8. Although we would be happier with a lower variance inflation factor, 5.8 is well below the threshold of 10, a value indicating that multicollinearity is dangerously influencing the estimates (Neter et. al.) . Another potential cause of sign reversal in regression models is the violation of the assumption that the error terms are independent. We tested this assumption by generating a sequence plot of the residuals (Neter et. al. 1996) . We ordered the countries by geographic region and plotted these against the residuals. The resultant scatter plot showed random variation, thus indicating that there is no correlation between the error terms of geographically proximate countries.
28. Note that the relationship between the years of U.N. membership and TSMO participation shows no effect in this model (despite a strong and positive bivariate relationship), due to the high correlation between this variable and a country's overall level of engagement in IGOs. We ran other models containing more limited measures of IGO participation (specifically membership in political as opposed to purely functional IGOs), and the years of experience in the U.N. remained positive and significant.
29. Markoff (1999 Markoff ( , 2003 shows that most global political institutions, and especially global financial institutions, currently disenfranchise the world's citizens, both nationally and internationally. While the United Nations is more inclusive, the absence of formal protections for citizens' group participation there means that these groups must constantly work to defend their access. But if transnational civic engagement parallels or exceeds the growth of inter-governmental organizations and institutional arrangements, this will help expand what is already considerable pressure on the world's governments to enhance the democratic character of the global polity, if only to ensure their own continued legitimacy.
